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The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the context in which 
mapping is practiced and thought about. I shall make several points. 
First, our present context is historical and arose from identifiable events 
that help shape the way mapping takes place today. But every context 
allows some possibilities and closes off others. Second, our current 
context is based on a Cartesian–scientific worldview which casts maps 
as communicators of spatial location. One consequence of this is that 
we do not take account of maps as helping us find our meaningful place 
in the world. Third, examining this context as a horizon of possibilities 
is itself a political project. Finally, some possible components of such a 
“politics of mapping” are sketched out that might let us understand our 
horizon of possibilities in order to expand it.
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Missing from [Kant’s critiques is] the mode of understanding itself, a volume 
devoted to the rhetorics of how we make sense of the world and of how we 
share that sense with others. Its provisional title: A Critique of Cartographi-
cal Reason.
––Gunnar Olsson (1998, 152)
Horizons of Possibility
his paper asks the question: what are the historical conditions of pos-
sibility for thinking cartographically? Our present context is historical 
and arose from identifiable events that help shape the way mapping 
takes place today. But every context allows some possibilities and closes 
off others. What is it possible to think and do? By emphasizing that these 
are historical conditions we are not consigning events to the past, but ac-
knowledging that different conditions may exist at different times. 
I suggest that the work of Heidegger and Foucault can shed consider-
able light on this question of our current context for three reasons. First, 
these questions can be seen as philosophical in the same sense as Heide-
gger’s ontological project about “being.” Heidegger’s constant concern 
with being (often capitalized in English as Being to distinguish it from a 
being) was a question not just of what exists but with being as such.1 Being 
is what it means to be (a short glossary of key terms is provided at the end 
of this paper). Heidegger’s work is notoriously difficult and strewn with 
vocabularies and etymologies of his own devising. Still, his ontological 
question does point the way towards an important emphasis on under-
standing being within a particular historical framework.
An historical ontology (Elden, 2001; Hacking, 2002) examines the very 
conditions of possibility for thinking itself, in order to widen those con-
ditions and increase the possibilities for human freedom. Putting it like 
this should tip us off to the fact that rather than armchair philosophizing 
this project is a politics, in this case a politics of mapping. Why? Because 
politics looks for the capability and grounds for intervening in the produc-
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tion of (spatial) knowledge, as well as for resistance to established power 
relations. Politics and philosophy (in this case ontological thinking) are 
both involved. Foucault’s “problematizations” are another way of doing 
historical ontology as we shall see.
Second, Heidegger’s project is relevant to cartographers because he 
argued that enquiry in general was dominated by a scientific approach 
that obscured essential aspects of how things are. Although Heidegger 
was writing in the 1920s and 30s there is no particular reason to suspect 
that scientific mentalities have become less dominant, either generally or 
in cartography. Yet Heidegger was not anti–science. He would grant that 
there are many wonderful insights and achievements in science. How-
ever, these are largely confined to the physical sciences. He was doubtful 
whether the “human sciences” could be conceived in the same manner. 
Because cartography, mapping and GIS are at the intersection of science 
and human science, and are also practices and technologies, it is a particu-
larly fascinating question to see how it has proceeded in this light. Brian 
Harley asked us much the same question: “are [cartographers] concerned 
at all with how maps could answer the Socratic question ‘How should one 
live?’” (Harley, 1990, 16). Or does that political question pass us by as we 
concern ourselves with accuracy and interoperability? Harley’s own reply 
is pessimistic, but perhaps he was too quick to judge. In any event, the 
success, goals, and problems of cartography’s Cartesian tradition can be 
assessed by Heidegger’s critique.
Third, Heidegger and Foucault were acutely aware of the importance 
and centrality of space in their thinking. Heidegger for example under-
stood our being as one of being–in–the–world and was interested in place, 
distance, nearness and spatiality (see eg., section 22 in Heidegger, 1962). 
Foucault’s concern with space in terms of its power–knowledge relations 
has also long attracted interest from geography (eg., Driver, 1985; Philo, 
1992) and cartography (Harley, 1989). Both Heidegger and Foucault play 
key roles in a larger project of “the politics of space” (Elden, 2001; Hannah, 
2000; Harvey, 2001).
In Gunnar Olsson’s essay quoted above he makes a striking observa-
tion: modern thinking (he calls it by the more technical name: reason) is 
cartographic and we need to examine this thinking, this rationality (see 
also Olsson, 2002). No doubt Heidegger and Foucault are not the only 
writers we could turn to if we want to understand mapping. What is 
important here are not the exact details of their writings but how their 
writings can cast light on mapping. The three reasons given above; high-
lighting the political conditions of possibility, a critique of cartography’s 
Cartesian tradition, and a concern with spatiality let us see what Olsson 
meant by a cartographic reason or rationality––our current context.
Theory and Practice in Cartography
What is our current context in which mapping takes place? One aspect 
can be examined by understanding the relationship between theory and 
practice. More than a dozen years ago Harley argued that cartography 
artificially divided theory and practice. At that time his concern was 
cartography’s social relevance and its “theoretical isolationism” as he 
called it (Harley, 1990, 1). Mapping is often granted conceptual (theoretic–
philosophic) and practical status (its practices). We distinguish between 
understanding maps and using maps. But there is all too often a failure to 
grasp how theory and practice affect each other. For example, maps are 
often used unreflectively for instrumental ends, to make things happen, 
while on the other hand some social theorists think of maps as repressive, 
“What is our current context in 
which mapping takes place?”
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and dangerously powerful, implying that we should use them only very 
reflectively.2 Elsewhere these positions have been characterized as “theory 
avoiding” and “theory embracing” (Crampton, 2000). Both have proved 
useful to their adherents, but both are only part of the story we can tell 
about mapping. Perhaps the way we use maps affects how we under-
stand them? Perhaps then if we can’t put maps into practice we gain only 
a limited understanding of them. (This has immediate consequences for 
the history of cartography because we cannot use historical maps in the 
context in which they originally existed.) By questioning our boundaries 
of thinking Harley was initiating what we can call a politics of mapping.
It’s not very usual to think of mapping as a politics. That maps some-
times have a political dimension, such as propaganda maps, advocacy 
maps or public participation GIS, yes; but that the practice of mapping 
itself (as the production of geographic knowledges) is a political project? 
That is not so clear. Perhaps our responsibility should be to make maps 
as a–political as possible. Certainly it was not too long ago when cartog-
raphers could explicitly state that there should be as little “intrusion” of 
politics (ideology) into mapping as possible.3 And attention to mapping 
from those interested in the politics of space has also been intermittent. 
The journal Political Geography, for example, editorialized on Harley’s 
death with the comment that “there has been no sustained effort to under-
stand the meaning of maps for the political processes we research” (Taylor, 
1992, 127). The journal understood that maps produce spatial knowledge 
and that this fed directly into and informed politics, but regretted that this 
topic had been so overlooked.
The opposition and neglect of this topic arises in part from an attempt 
to conceptualize cartography as purely technical, but it goes further than 
that. It also depends on the constitution of cartographic knowledge as an 
a priori, that is, as beyond the reach of human conceptualizing (it existed 
“prior” to our concepts and politics and is independently true). On this 
view, maps represent the things in the environment themselves, and cut 
nature at its joints (see Andrews’ introduction in Harley, 2001 for such 
a view). A historical ontology on the other hand suggests that the way 
things are, their being, is in fact a historical product operating within a 
certain horizon of possibilities. We are in a certain contingent way and can 
be different. If this view is valid then a politics of mapping is not just a 
question of propaganda maps (maps used politically) or even a political 
critique of existing maps, but a more sweeping project of examining and 
breaking through the boundaries on how maps are, and our projects and 
practices with them. This is politics in a very positive sense. And it would 
pretty much have to be a project that was always ongoing––we would 
never reach a conceptualization of maps “out” of history. Heidegger 
signals this in the title of his best–known work Being and Time (Heidegger, 
1962).
Harley’s attempt to address these issues (eg., Harley 1988a; 1988b; 1989; 
2001) was a necessary step in bridging the intellectual gap between theory 
and practice, but it was ultimately unsuccessful and sadly incomplete 
(Harley died in 1991 at the age of 59). The reasons for this failure have 
been detailed elsewhere but have to do with Harley’s conceptualization of 
power and politics (Crampton, 2001). Harley was a new kind of cartogra-
pher, and I can think of few other cartographers before him who studied 
the relation between maps and power. Symptomatically he would deny 
he was a cartographer, but in fact his work can be understood as making 
it possible to be a new kind of cartographer. But even Harley constituted 
cartographic knowledge as a priori. Thus his project became one of un-
covering the layers of ideology inscribed in the map to get at the golden 
“It’s not very usual to think of 
mapping as a politics.”
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nugget of truth underlying it all. On this view, power is repressive (a view 
never held by Foucault for all that Harley appealed to him). Since Harley’s 
death, progress toward a critical politics of cartography which bridges 
the gap between theory and technology has been sporadic or carried out 
under other names––yet it has never entirely disappeared (see Yapa, 1991; 
1992; Edney, 1993; Pickles, 1995; Cosgrove, 1999; Harvey, 2001; Black, 
1997; Elden, 2001; Monmonier, 2001). What is at issue, but which has not 
yet been clearly articulated in this work, is a critical politics of mapping, 
rather than just a political critique of existing maps (more on this below).
Harley’s fruitful contribution was to ask the vital question about what 
mapping is and could be, and like Heidegger to set us on the path of 
questioning its possibilities. That’s why Matthew Edney called his obitu-
ary of Harley “Questioning Maps, Questioning Cartography, Questioning 
Cartographers” (Edney, 1992). But surely other cartographers and geog-
raphers have also thought about what mapping is? Arthur Robinson, for 
example, even co–authored a book called The Nature of Maps (Robinson 
& Petchenik, 1976). Was this not about the being of mapping? The longer 
answer to this is suggested in the next section but the short answer is that 
Robinson and Harley’s projects were different because Robinson tried to 
describe how maps are, whereas Harley asks why maps are as they are, 
and how else they can be. It is this latter project which is the political one.
It is a key argument of this paper that maps and GIS are important 
sources for the production of geographic knowledge. What are the 
power–knowledge relations of mapping as they occur against the histori-
cal hori-zon of possibilities, and how that horizon can be enlarged. This 
is a question of the historical formation of mapping concepts (eg., about 
cyberspace) as an epistemology, and the possibilities that are given to us 
for the being of those concepts, or an ontology. In other words, theory and 
practice.
The Fisherman’s Problem: ontic and ontological knowledges
What does it mean to open the question of the conditions of possibility for 
cartography, and how does this constitute a question which is philosophi-
cal and political? To provide an initial response to these questions we can 
go back to a distinction between two types of knowledge that were impor-
tant to Heidegger’s work (see Heidegger, 1962, §4):
1. Ontic knowledge, which concerns the knowledge of things as such; 
and
2. Ontological knowledge, which concerns the conditions of possibility 
for ontic knowledge.
For example the question “how old is the Vinland map” is an ontical 
question, whereas “what is the mode of being of maps” is an ontological 
question. The first question may be addressed and resolved by science, but 
not the second (Polk, 1999, 34). Elden adds that “Heidegger’s own exercise 
of fundamental ontology deals with the conditions of possibility not just 
of the ontic sciences, but also of the ontologies that precede and found 
them. This is the question of being” (Elden, 2001, 9). Heidegger’s distinc-
tion suggests that ontical enquiry often characterizes disciplinary work 
because it can be addressed scientifically. In the discipline of cartography 
for example, we enquire how to satisfactorily generalize and symbolize 
landscape features, or which projection best reduces distortion. But this 
ontic language of science and objectivity itself takes place within a concep-
tual framework (ontologically). We can call this the fisherman’s problem, 
“Harley’s fruitful contribution 
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using an insightful metaphor from Gunnar Olsson: “The fisherman’s catch 
furnishes more information about the meshes of his net than about the 
swarming reality that dwells beneath the surface” (Olsson, 2002, 255). The 
fisherman certainly catches real fish that were in the ocean (that is, ontical 
enquiry certainly can say truthful things about the real world). But if he 
tried to say something about the reality of the denizens of the ocean, his 
explanation would be related to the size of his fishing net. He wouldn’t 
have much to say about whales or sharks, nor about sea anemones. The 
net therefore plays a double function of both revealing things about the 
sea and hiding or concealing them. For Heidegger this double function of 
unconcealing–concealing is an abiding aspect of our understanding of be-
ing. If Heidegger is right then studying maps and mapping would seem to 
include as much about what maps can’t or don’t do as what they can do. 
This is why Harley spoke of the silences of the map (Harley, 1988b).
If we now go back to the difference between Robinson and Harley we 
can see that where the former described the fish in the net, the philoso-
phies of Foucault and Heidegger are concerned with the net itself. Harley 
also asked about the net. What does the net catch? Do we like what it 
catches? Have other places or times had other kinds of nets which caught 
different things? What do we suspect the net to be unable to catch? How 
can we change the net to catch other things? According to Heidegger our 
present “ontological net” is critically flawed because it sets up being in a 
very scientific way. We like to measure things and treat them as objective 
presences on the landscape that can be re–presented. Again, this critique 
of science should remind us more of Harley than Robinson.
The ontic–ontological distinction is a familiar one in the history of 
philosophy, dating back to Descartes and Kant. When Heidegger took it 
up, he distinguished between living life as such (making choices against 
a background of possibilities) for which he coins the term “existentiell” 
understanding, and the questioning of what constitutes existence and the 
structure of these possibilities, which he calls the “existential” understand-
ing (Heidegger, 1962, §3–4). This existential understanding is one directed 
toward the meaning of being. Heidegger begins his book by stating that 
we are very far from answering the question of what an existential under-
standing might be; so far, in fact, that the very question itself is forgotten 
(Heidegger, 1962, §1).
These bewildering terms might make us wonder why it’s worth worry-
ing about the “being of maps.” Why not study concrete maps that actu-
ally exist? Heidegger’s response is essentially to refer us once again to the 
fisherman’s problem. Sure, we could study the contents of the net. This is 
what we do when we study maps and mapping, especially from a scientif-
ic viewpoint. It is ontical enquiry about things. But the only way to know 
anything meaningful about the nature of the ocean is to understand our 
conceptual framework from within which we understand that ocean––to 
look at the net itself. This ontological looking means thinking about being 
as such, including the being of maps. The fact that it sounds strange to say 
this (“the being of maps”) is just one indication that we hardly ever think 
this way, that is, philosophically. Perhaps if we do so, we can open up a 
new and productive dialog about mapping.
How we might do philosophical thinking
What is philosophy today––philosophical activity I mean––if it is not 
the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does 
it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to what extent it 
might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is 
already known?
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Foucault, 1985, 8–9
If we grant that the ontic–ontological distinction is helpful, it is still not 
immediately apparent how ontology might be carried out in cartography. 
And what about ontical enquiry? If the whole way maps can be is expand-
ed, it seems as if the ontical questions would have to change too. Since 
ontological thinking is rare and neglected (according to Heidegger) there 
won’t be many examples to draw from. Luckily there is one well–known 
example that we can examine that picks up where Heidegger left off. Even 
better, it is directly relevant to cartography. The following is an extract 
from a lecture in November 1983:
Most of the time a historian of ideas tries to determine when a specific 
concept appears, and this moment is often identified by the appear-
ance of a new word. But what I am attempting to do as a historian of 
thought is something different. I am trying to analyze the way insti-
tutions, practices, habits, and behavior become a problem for people 
who behave in specific sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, 
who engage in certain kinds of practices, and who put to work specific 
kinds of institutions. The history of ideas involves the analysis of a 
notion from its birth, through its development, and in the setting of 
other ideas which constitute its context. The history of thought is the 
analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of 
practices which were accepted without question, which were familiar 
and ‘silent,’ out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion 
and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previ-
ously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions. The history of 
thought, understood in this way, is the history of the way people begin 
to take care of something, of the way they became anxious about this 
or that––for example, about madness, about crime, about sex, about 
themselves, or about truth (Foucault, 2001, 74).
It is worth trying to understand Foucault’s meaning here. He begins by 
making a claim that the work he is doing is a history, but that it is not like 
the history we are most typically used to. So Foucault is a historian but 
not a traditional one. A traditional historian is interested in the “history of 
ideas” or what is thought at a particular time (the zeitgeist, contemporary 
discourse, what people said at the time as recorded in newspapers, jour-
nals, writings, records; i.e., the historical “archive”). Foucault, however, is 
interested in how things “become a problem” or problematizations. When 
something which was previously unproblematic does become a problem 
then people start to pay attention to it, even worry about it and try to 
deal with it. We can pick up on these periods of problematization as times 
when the regular ongoing behaviors are no longer possible in the old way. 
It might cause “cartographic anxiety” (Angst) as Gregory called it (Greg-
ory, 1994). In this sense, mapping is a problematization itself. We map 
because we are concerned with a certain aspect of the environment and 
wish to try and deal with it. A Foucauldian history of cartography would 
be a history of how a particular problem was taken up cartographically.
In fact, it’s the fisherman’s problem again. We reel in the net and find it 
has big gaping vents and weird bite marks over it that prevents us from 
fishing as normal. We begin to suspect some large beast down there that 
is too strong for the net, so we research ways of strengthening the net 
or making the mesh coarser. Or perhaps we switch from net fishing that 
scoops up everything, to making a distinction between fish–for–consump-
“A Foucauldian history of 
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tion and fish–as–part–of–an–ecological–system. Now fishing is not just a 
question of extracting resources but concernful participation in an ecologi-
cal system. Because of a problematization, fishing as a way of being has 
changed.
A good cartographic example is provided by the controversy over the 
Peters projection. In the decades following the introduction of his world 
map, Arno Peters attracted dozens of articles that were highly critical of 
it (Monmonier, 1995). But Peters persisted, his map was adopted by aid 
agencies and the World Council of Churches, and was even featured on 
the US TV show The West Wing. It was and still is a big problem for cartog-
raphers. While their approach was ontical (they pointed out all the tech-
nical reasons he was wrong) it is also possible to read the controversy as 
saying something defining about cartography itself (Crampton, 1994). Per-
haps Peters, explicitly using the map as a politics, has made a new way for 
mapping to be. On this view, the cartographic opposition is inadequate, 
not because cartographers missed the point (their technical criticisms of 
Peters were certainly true) but because Peters created a new point!
Aspects of problematization include the following:
1. It is to deal with something as a problem at a particular time: for 
example, why did the Peters projection become such a hot–button 
issue at this time?
2. Second, to problematize something is not to do a history of ideas 
but: “to define the conditions in which human beings ‘problema-
tize’ what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live” 
(Foucault, 1985, 10). Problematizations are an ontology, not ontical 
enquiries.
3. Finally, to problematize is to examine the larger truth claims of the 
discourses: “problematization doesn’t mean representation of a pre-
existing object, nor the creation by discourse of an object that doesn’t 
exist. It is the totality of discursive or non–discursive practices that 
introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes 
it as an object for thought” (Foucault, 1988, 257).
Problematization is an analysis of the conditions of possibility for ontic 
knowledge. Often these conditions remain unanalyzed and only at certain 
times do we question our horizons of thought.4 This has many fruitful 
ramifications, not all of which can be examined here. One important as-
pect however, is that every context establishes normalized ways of being. 
The hue and cry over the Peters projection for example was over whether 
it was acceptable (“normal”) for a map to be like that. Normalization is a 
very powerful aspect of ontology because it tends to stabilize established 
power–knowledge structures. Normalization is often one of those negative 
effects of power with which Foucault is identified. When people especially 
are on the wrong end of normalization processes it can ruin their lives, but 
the response to this is not to escape from power but rather to use it pro-
ductively (McWhorter, 1999). Power’s positivity is an aspect of Foucault’s 
enquiry that is often overlooked.
In the next section I provide a more extended example of how we might 
proceed with a problematization in cartography. The flip side of this is that 
when we fail to problematize we unreflectively work within normaliza-
tion.
Problematizing the Essential Lie
In this section I would like to contrast and play off against each other two 
“Problematization is an analy-
sis of the conditions of possibil-
ity for ontic knowledge.”
cartographic perspectives    
     
                                11Number 41, Winter 2002
books by Monmonier (1996, 2001). In the first we can analyze his assertion 
“[n]ot only is it easy to lie with maps, it’s essential” (Monmonier, 1996, 1) 
to show that this very powerful statement pervades cartography, and that 
it produces the unproblematized ontology of contemporary mapping. By 
contrast, in Monmonier’s more recent book it is possible to discern some 
pointers towards a more critical problematization of cartographic knowl-
edge production.
Monmonier (1996, 1) writes “[n]ot only is it easy to lie with maps, it’s 
essential”. There are at least three terms of significance: “easy,” “lie” and 
“essential.” All three terms surround a fourth, the map, which takes its 
shape and its being from this tripartite structure in which it finds itself. It 
is of the essence, it is essential, necessary, that maps lie. In order for a map 
“to be” a map, it must lie. Lying is in the essence of the map. Furthermore 
it is easy for maps to lie, it is not something which is difficult or which can 
only be achieved after a struggle in the sense of going against something’s 
nature. This ease is well–known and assumed in the statement that could 
thus be rewritten: “Not only (as you know) is it easy to lie . . .” but also 
(and here we introduce the new idea, which we didn’t previously know) 
it is essential and necessary. The natural ease of lying becomes something 
that is essential and important, that is, we don’t have to struggle against 
this natural tendency of lying, but rather should embrace it as something 
positive. This is further alluded to in the next few lines where Monmonier 
writes that “to avoid hiding critical information in a fog of detail,” in 
order that the truth does not get overwhelmed “an accurate map must tell 
white lies” (Monmonier, 1996, 1). So this positivity, this advantage to ly-
ing, is that it will yield truth. In order to tell the truth, we must lie. So any 
truth–telling, such as the map, comprises as an essential part, lie. A map is 
both lie, and necessarily and as a result, truthful. And “there is no escape” 
(Monmonier, 1996, 1) from this.
This is an old and essential idea in cartography. It can be found, for 
example, in the famous saying of Korzybski that “a map is not the terri-
tory it represents, but if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, 
which accounts for its usefulness” (Korzybski, 1948, 58). The political 
consequences of this ontology of mapping are clear.5 Our task as mappers 
becomes one of deciding where to draw the line between the elements 
of truth and lie in the map. It is a normative ontological statement: maps 
“ought to be” truth–tellers. We police the boundary, we watch it, in order 
to make sure that there is not too much lie nor insufficient truth in the 
map. It becomes a question of separating the good maps, where the lie can 
be justified (it is just, legal) from the bad maps, where the lie cannot be 
justified (it is illegal, it has passed over the horizon). In this way we make 
the difference between USGS topographic quad sheets and propaganda 
maps. We’re immediately made aware of the danger of sliding away from 
truth–telling by Monmonier: “it’s not difficult for maps also to tell more 
serious lies” (Monmonier, 1996, 1). Thus in order to recognize when a map 
moves illegally across this border Monmonier has written this book, a text 
on drawing the line which is therefore an ethical text on the problem of 
truth in mapping.
These “dividing practices” of normalization were for Foucault a hall-
mark of modern thought, which for example can be seen in his work on 
how the mad are separated from the sane, criminals from “good boys,” 
the sick from the healthy. In other words it is how something gets entered 
into “the play of true and false.” Dividing practices are normalizations of 
cartographic thought.6
Monmonier’s fascinating account of the role of mapping in producing 
favorable electoral districts (Monmonier, 2001) illustrates the difference 
“It becomes a question of
separating the good maps . . . 
from the bad maps . . .”
      12 Number 41, Winter 2002 cartographic perspectives    
between acknowledging the use of maps for political purposes and a 
more strongly conceived critical politics of spatial knowledge production 
by mapping. For most of his book, Monmonier discusses redistricting, 
gerrymandering, and the legal requirement that political districts achieve 
“compactness” (as measured through competing indices) and how these 
distinctions can be used to derive legitimate from illegitimate voting 
districts (in the legal sense). As such, his discussion is an example of how 
ideas act as dividing practices, especially between what is acceptable and 
what is not. However, in the last two chapters Monmonier turns from 
this historical account to explicitly question the way that modern voting 
districts are constituted.
Using the nomination (later withdrawn by President Clinton) of Lani 
Guinier to assistant attorney general for civil rights in 1993, Monmonier 
points out that alternative methods of electing representatives––multi-
member districts and proportional representation––to the American (and 
UK and France) system of “first past the post” have plenty of historical 
and international precedence. According to Monmonier “[p]roportional 
voting is used extensively throughout the world, by developed countries 
in northern Europe and the western Pacific as well as by less prosperous 
nations in Latin America and parts of Africa” (2001, 144). Thus, despite the 
negative press Guinier received (as a “quota queen,” and a promoter of ra-
cial preferences) Monmonier interprets her as problematizing the political 
agenda as far as space and representational politics are concerned: “Amer-
ican–style elections are not a prerequisite for democracy” (Monmonier, 
1996, 146). This raises the question of what prerequisites are necessary, and 
what the historical horizon of possibilities might permit or disallow at the 
moment.
Monmonier successfully “puts into play” questions concerning space 
and politics in real–life practical situations. As such, his work is poten-
tially useful for a critical politics of representation and mapping, and for 
critical geography more generally. Monmonier does not necessarily cast 
his work in this light himself. But thinking critically and philosophically 
about mapping, space and politics does not necessarily entail taking up 
a position on the political spectrum. It is rather to question the essence of 
that spectrum and to help redefine it.
Towards a Critical Politics of Cartography
“Even . . . apparently arcane ontological and epistemological questions 
must be part of the debate [about cartography]. They too raise issues 
of practical ethical concern. Our philosophy––our understanding of 
the nature of maps––is not merely a part of some abstract intellectual 
analysis but ultimately a major strand in the web of social relations by 
which cartographers project their values into the world”
Harley, 1991, 13.
Harley’s words suggest that it is but a short step from questioning the 
bounds and limits of our lives (philosophy) to politics and that maps are 
an important practical component of social relations. It is an important 
step that connects philosophy and action.
First, maps might be sites of struggle. This struggle is a political one 
where knowledge and power structures meet. To understand cartography 
politically opens and allows intervention in the struggle over the deploy-
ment of power–knowledge effects. On the basis of these questions it is 
possible to imagine new possibilities, changes, and human being at both 
the individual and societal levels for cyberspace, as Guinier and Mon-
“Harley’s words suggest that it 
is but a short step from
questioning the bounds and 
limits of our lives (philosophy) 
to politics . . .”
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monier indicated. As such, this is a political project where we see “the 
development of domains, acts, practices, and thoughts that seem . . .  to 
pose problems for politics” (Foucault, 1997a, 114).
Second, maps may not have to produce space only objectively and 
scientifically, which according to Heidegger has nothing to do with how 
we live, our experiences, or pleasures. Maps ought to be able to play a 
significant role in the political project of finding our place in the world. 
As Harley put it “when we make a map it is not only a metonymic sub-
stitution but also an ethical statement about the world . . . [it] is a political 
issue” (Harley, 1990, 6). For example, if we are interested in understanding 
an historical map we may think we need to examine it as an object and 
to assess what information it may contain (eg., see Woodward, 1974). Yet 
this will not tell us how the map was used and lived as part of a struggle 
of making sense of the world. It will omit the experiential side of the map 
as well as any lived context in which to situate our understanding. Us-
ing or experiencing historical maps in their original context is not easy. 
It’s no wonder that instead we objectify maps. Yet maps are meaningful 
understandings of the world, not just mechanisms for communication. 
This point echoes a critique made as long ago as 1976 by Leonard Guelke 
(Guelke, 1976). Guelke argued that the focus on communication in cartog-
raphy was seriously inadequate because it doesn’t take into account map 
meaning.
Insofar as a map is thought of as simply communicating an already 
known and digested knowing, then the questioning (of the horizon) is 
not permitted and is foreclosed. This very foreclosing gives the map its 
authority and power. But “it awakens nothing in the way of a questioning 
attitude or even a questioning disposition. For this consists in a willing–
to–know. Willing––this is not just wishing and trying. Whosoever wishes 
to know also seems to question; but he does not get beyond saying the 
question, he stops short precisely where the question begins. Questioning 
is willing–to–know” (Heidegger, 2000, 22). If we use a map just because 
we wish to know something, to be on the receiving end of an information 
transmission, then we have stopped short of mapping as problematiza-
tion. We have chosen to limit ourselves to thinking within the bounds of 
our ontology, rather than willing to know what mapping can be and how 
it can open up a world.
In the ontic cartographic practice so far established the best maps are 
those which are the most conclusive, the ones which most authoritatively 
communicate the truth of the landscape (an authority which is vested 
in their adherence to the rules, rules which are at this particular histori-
cal juncture provided by science). But what we aim for here are maps 
that willfully challenge normalization. For from this questioning comes 
the possibility of an unfolding of the being of maps and mapping. In the 
remainder of this article therefore I wish to suggest or open up some pos-
sibilities which might contribute to a critical politics of cartography by 
posing two major questions: why pursue a critical politics of cartography; 
and second, of what does it consist?
Why pursue a critical politics of cartography?
We can begin this question by identifying a necessary linkage between 
the political and the spatial, a linkage that is essential, rather than just an 
occasional political option. The manifold relationship between space and 
politics has been examined elsewhere (see eg., Elden, 2000) but we can 
gain a flavor of it by returning to the origin of the word “political.” What 
did this word mean for the Greeks? As Sallis puts it, referring to Plato’s 
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cosmological dialogue the Timaeus:
How is it, in particular, that reference to the earth belongs to political 
discourse? The answer, most succinctly, is: necessarily––taking necessity 
to have the sense it has in the Timaeus. Discourse on the city [polis] will 
at some point or other be compelled, of necessity, to make reference to 
the earth; at some point or other it will have to tell of the place on earth 
where the city is–or is to be–established and to tell how the constitution 
(politeia) of the city both determines and is determined by this location” 
Sallis, 1999, 139
The political then originally meant how we should live, and how we 
should arrange the city (or place or site) in which we need to dwell. To use 
Heidegger’s phrase, we are concerned with our being–in–the–world. At 
the beginning of this paper I suggested that Heidegger brought a geo-
graphic sensibility to light, and here we can see why. The spatial in the 
sense of this polis constitutes the political. Here we are very close to phe-
nomenological enquiry in geography (eg., Pickles, 1985). Elden elaborates:
In his rethinking of the [polis], Heidegger makes a potentially major 
contribution to political theory, by suggesting the links implicit in the 
phrase ‘political geography.’ Following Heidegger, we might suggest 
that ‘there is a politics of space because politics is spatial’ (Elden, 2000, 
419, original emphasis).
Elden’s work (see also Elden, 2001) is critically important here because 
he recovers from Heidegger the idea of the polis as the site of human exis-
tence (an idea which was lost when polis was simply translated as “city” 
or “city–state”). The polis rather is the site and abode of human history. 
As a spatialized entity (site, abode) it is what constitutes the political and 
allows us to rethink it. Maps, because they “make reference to the earth” 
are part of this constituting. Maps produce knowledge through mapping 
practices, but as problematizations their knowledge is always in a certain 
context, is normalized, in a power relation, and therefore for all these 
reasons, political.
It is precisely not a question therefore of examining “the” political 
in mapping, which is how the question has been framed until now. It is 
not a question of “looking for” the political in maps, for this would be 
to assume an a priori realm of the political which is sometimes injected 
into maps and which makes their content political. On this view we are 
mislead into uncovering this political content, which is the project I argue 
Harley pursued. On the view I am discussing here, the project is rather to 
Figure 1. In this Doonesbury cartoon, the joke is dependent on a distinction between the content of 
the map being political (caribou–as–Democrats) and the position of the map within a political situ-
ation and how it helps constitute that political situation. (Used with permission of Universal Press 
Syndicate.)
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investigate and reveal how mapping necessarily produces the political, 
and how rethinking mapping can lead to a rethinking and questioning of 
the political. This as such and of itself is both a definition and a call to a 
critical politics of cartography.
A Doonesbury cartoon can bring to light some of these points (Fig. 1).
In 2001, a USGS cartographer lost his job over a map he made of cari-
bou calving areas in an area wanted for oil exploration. Rick says “it [the 
map] was political.” The joke is that Joanie deliberately misunderstands 
and pretends that the content of the map (the caribou) is political (obvious-
ly caribou can’t be Democrats or even independents). What is political is 
the map’s position in a wider political situation. This example shows that 
a politics of cartography does not study the political content of the map–
–as if we could temporarily “adopt” a political mode of enquiry or “look 
for” political things in the map (as has happened in studies of propaganda 
maps and in Harley’s work) but how maps as spatial knowledge creative-
ly constitute politics itself. Our target is politics (understood as a horizon 
of possibilities) and not maps themselves. We are interested in “a politics 
of mapping” and not a cartography of politics.
In the last section of this paper I will sketch out a few possibilities for 
what a critical politics of mapping may look like. These are not proposi-
tions, axioms or even guidelines, but rather some issues that might bear 
thinking through. The idea here is not to put boundaries on a subject, but 
to open up and explore it. Perhaps they are best seen as statements in the 
process of being superceded, overturned and rejected.
Of what would such a project consist?
1. A critical politics of cartography is a problematization. As we have 
already noted and lead to, a critical politics of cartography is highly 
situated spatially. That is, specific understandings of space at particular 
historical moments are analyzed. A problematization of these moments 
would enquire what issues were taken up as problems in order to investi-
gate the horizons of possibility of mapping. For example, why did the-
matic mapping emerge in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Europe 
(especially France)? During this period (1780–1830) many of the standard 
thematic map types we are familiar with today were invented, such as the 
choropleth and proportional symbol maps. An enquiry about the condi-
tions under which these map types were invented might proceed from 
the fact that they were not invented by cartographers but were part of a 
specific discourse about political economy. The choropleth map (invented 
in 1826 by a Count Charles Dupin) in particular was a very influential 
method and practice of demonstrating where the state was developed or 
underdeveloped, and hence where the state’s resources might need to be 
directed. Thus the map at this time was understood as a key component in 
governing the state more efficiently. Furthermore, thematic maps were in-
strumental in forming a statistical framework in which to understand the 
problem of governance. Statistics were increasingly used to assess “moral” 
questions, or what we would now call socio–economic issues (crime, birth 
rates, suicide, early marriages, etc.).
Statistics were able to provide insight into what was “normal” and 
what was abnormal or deviant, and maps were then able to produce 
pictures or snapshots of normality over the territory of the state. This lead 
in part to an increasing need to collect more statistics, and the 19th century 
saw a great boom in these statistical collection procedures, most notably 
of course the national census (Hannah, 2000; 2001). Atlases of the census, 
“Thus the map . . . was
understood as a key component 
in governing the state . . .”
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such as Francis A. Walker’s great atlas of 1874 (the first statistical atlas of 
America) were extensions of this way of producing geographic knowledge 
(as normalized resources). What was a problem for the 19th century politi-
cal economists was the issue of how best to govern the territory of the 
state and it was operationalized in a very particular way which has had 
long–lasting effects (not the least of which is the predominance of statisti-
cal mapping in problem–solving). A critical politics takes up the way that 
maps have been cast in an effort to imagine other cartographies that are 
not based on mapping normalized resources. We saw this earlier when we 
encountered Heidegger’s critique of science as an ontic enquiry. Problema-
tizations are concerned with the ontological horizon of possibilities.
2. Critical politics of cartography is a struggle in the sense of a political 
intervention or participation. A critical politics is not passive, but also very 
actively directed at intervening in the production of cartographic knowl-
edge. This arises because as a problematization we are interested in how 
the particular historical horizon came to define our thinking and practices. 
As we have seen normalization is one powerful procedure in stabilizing 
this horizon, a stability that can nevertheless by undermined through a 
critique which sees the horizon as contingent and changeable following 
intervention. An example of such intervention in mapping is the “Pub-
lic Participation GIS” (PPGIS) project formed by the National Center for 
Geographic Information and Analysis (NCGIA) and the Varenius Project 
(Craig, Harris & Weiner, 1999). PPGIS can trace its roots to the early 1990s, 
when discussions in various journals and at meetings raised the question 
of the relationship between GIS and society. Prior to that is a concern with 
community mapping (eg., Aberley, 1993). The work has developed ways 
in which “alternative GIS” could be developed which empowers commu-
nities, especially those which are marginalized. Terms such as “empower-
ment” and “marginalization” were themselves critically assessed, and the 
creative tension of GIS as both enabling and marginalizing is acknowl-
edged. 
These efforts can be large and strategic, or small, tactical interventions 
on a particular issue. An example of the latter was the work of a gradu-
ate seminar in cartography in the spring of 2002. The seminar performed 
community mapping in an Atlanta neighborhood called Cabbagetown 
(Crampton, et al., 2002). Cabbagetown is one of Atlanta’s oldest working 
class neighborhoods, founded in the 1880s as a factory village to support a 
cotton mill. Today its very identity is being contested as it undergoes gen-
trification and the conversion of the mill into gated lofts. The seminar was 
interested in how the historical “memory” of this unique neighborhood 
may be expressed through mapping as a process of producing spatial 
identity, and how in turn those memories may be spread and made ac-
cessible to current residents. Techniques involved an online GIS, resident 
surveys, participant observation and many other ethnographic practices. 
The goal was to work with community leaders and residents in order to 
make the online GIS part of the experience of living in Cabbagetown (as 
opposed to an outsider’s representation of it). In this sense, mapping is 
a struggle over how to remember the past and to write its biography in 
maps. Often this writing means opposing received wisdom or the “auto–
bio–geographies” inscribed by structures of power. Thus in general we can 
say that a critical politics of cartography involves the positive production 
of counter–memory (McWhorter, 1999) and counter–mappings (because 
they are written counter to power).
3. The critical politics of cartography is an ethics, or what Foucault 
(1985) called an askêsis, a Greek word for exercise or practice. That is to say 
the project is “ethical” if by this word we understand not the “rights and 
“A critical politics takes up the 
way that maps have been cast in 
an effort to imagine other
cartographies that are not based 
on mapping normalized
resources.”
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wrongs” of mapping, but ethos, the mores or practices of the time. Ethics 
means: how shall we live in practice? In turn we ask: What is the origin 
of these practices? How do they constitute the horizon of possibilities of 
being? What other mapping practices might emerge under a different ho-
rizon and how can we open these other horizons? Mapping practices as an 
ethics in this sense have yet to be properly considered politically. One sug-
gestion is to take up the challenge of the ethics of mapping as a practice 
of freedom (Foucault, 1997b) through the “pleasure of mapping.” Given 
how desire has operated to so completely normalize people, for example 
“gay desire” (McWhorter, 1999), it may be that sheer pleasure offers some 
positive ways forward. Maps as pleasure is appealing, perhaps evoking 
the reason people take up mapping as a practice in the first place, before 
it is laden down with jargon. It is in this sense that I use the phrase “maps 
as finding our place in the world”, maps as pleasurable sense–making of 
the world. Unfortunately we still know very little about the pleasure of 
mapping––although Wood has written on it (Wood, 1987) and Harley’s 
beautiful piece on the map as biography may hold some initial clues (Har-
ley, 1987, see also Gould’s response, 1999, 74–78).
4. A critical politics of cartography is a technology. By this I mean that 
we engage with the specific technological question of cartography and 
its relation to power–knowledge. As was mentioned earlier, cartography 
raises this issue to the foreground because of its singular place at the 
intersection of art, science, technology and practice. In today’s context 
by “technology” we mean primarily cartography and mapping as ways 
of being that depend on instruments and digitality as a means to an end. 
As such, it may leave behind other aspects of “technology”. The original 
word for technology is the Greek technê which meant art, skill, way of 
making or doing. This sense is however quite lost when mapping technol-
ogy produces knowledge as a resource or “standing–reserve” (Heidegger, 
1977). Two short examples illustrate this point.
First, the question of “interoperability” or how well data and data-
bases integrate with each other. Interoperability has been mentioned as 
one of the leading technological issues in GIS and digital mapping today 
(Monmonier, 1999) although the word only came into common usage in 
the early 1990s (in the sense of integrating software or data; the word was 
used prior to this in a military context to refer to how well military equip-
ment from different countries worked with each other, as well as how dif-
ferent computers networks can be integrated, but these are not necessarily 
the same associations we have in GIS/mapping now). What role does 
interoperability have on the normalization of data? For example, what 
value will be attached to data that cannot be made interoperable (because 
they are too local or outside the scientific purview)? How will we judge 
and value maps or databases when they already have an a priori existence 
as interoperable? This is technology as an impoverished instrumentality 
because it is a cause of an end already in sight (that is, interoperability). 
What we are interested in with technology however is how it can bring 
about insight into meaningful human life.
Second, the relationship between cartography as a science and an art 
is still seen as problematic (see eg., Woodward, 2001). No doubt this is 
part of a larger question of the degree to which cartography sees itself 
as a technology, science or art. Some cartographers have demonstrated 
how it is possible to productively reinterpret technology not in order to 
exploit the environment as a resource but to let the essence of the land-
scape emerge (eg., Patterson, 2002). Patterson has mastered the art of 
digital mapping from a manual tradition which pays close attention to the 
things themselves (see the work of Erwin Raisz and Heinrich Berann). An 
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Figure 2. Crater Lake, Oregon on National Park Service (NPS) maps. Produced entirely from digital 
sources. Source: Patterson, 2002.
example of his work is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows the detail and realism on NPS maps, the aesthetic 
quality that can be achieved in the digital realm and not least the superb 
integration of art and science by bringing out the qualities of the land-
scape itself. It is critical to note that it is necessary for the cartographer to 
pay very close attention to the landscape and to understand its processes 
and ideally to work from personal experience. There is no question here of 
“automatic” hillshading or whatever. The concepts of “art” and “science” 
recede in the light of the landscape itself.
Summary
This paper has suggested that in order to pursue a necessary political proj-
ect with mapping (cartography and GIS) we need to think about the being 
of maps at this present moment. This “philosophical” enquiry turns out to 
have numerous critical outcomes of a practical nature. An important dis-
tinction was made between knowledge about things in themselves (what 
we know) and the horizon of possibility for knowing in general (how we 
know what we know). It is critical to make this distinction because to fail 
to do so is to fail to think politically. It is by asking what are the conditions 
of thinking in cartography that we can both see the shape of that thinking, 
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to see it as it is, and therefore to begin to see how it might be otherwise. It 
is to think about the being of maps. Seeing this as a critical politics of car-
tography I suggested a few ways in which this project could be pursued: 
as a problematization in Foucault’s sense (a history and critique of the 
present), as an ethics, as a struggle, and as a question of technology.
Short Glossary of Key Terms
H = from Heidegger
F = from Foucault
Being: what it means to be (H)
Existentiell: our everyday understanding about ourselves (H)
Existential: about existence and being as such (H)
Genealogy, history of the present: an account which reveals historical 
ontology (F)
Ontic: knowledge of specific things (H)
Ontological: the historical conditions of possibility of ontic knowledge (H)
Problematization: historically contingent disturbances of the ontological 
(F)
This essay benefited from the constructive suggestions of Camille Duch-
êne, David Weberman, Scott Freundschuh and three anonymous referees. 
One of these referees provided very thorough comments which were 
extremely helpful in my thinking.
1I deviate from common practice in not capitalizing the word being be-
cause this has the effect in English of reifying the concept and making it 
harder to grasp.
2For example, Harvey characterizes mapping as hegemonic: “mapping 
requires a map and that maps are typically totalizing, usually two-dimen-
sional, Cartesian, and very undialectical devices with which it is pos-
sible to propound any mixture of extraordinary insights and monstrous 
lies” (1996, pp. 4–5). Ó Tuathail points to power relations (re)produced 
through mapping: “[I]dealized maps from the center clash with the lived 
geographies of the margin, with the controlling cartographic visions of 
the former frequently inducing cultural conflict, war, and displacement” 
(1996), p. 2.
3A well-known example is provided by Harley (1991, p. 16) who quotes 
one cartographer during the debate about the Peters projection as saying 
“it escapes me how politics, etc. can enter into it” (the quote is from Duane 
Marble).
4The relation between Foucault’s problematizations and Heidegger’s 
ontology and especially his “equipmental breakdown” is discussed in 
Schwartz, 1998 and Elden, 2001. As Polt points out, Heidegger also antici-
pates Kuhn’s argument on paradigm shifts (Polt, 1999, p. 33, fn. 16).
5As one referee correctly pointed out, there is also an internal disciplinary 
politics to protect the gate keeping of cartographic truth from any at-
tempts (such as Harley’s) to undermine or question it.
6Heidegger’s notion of being as revealing–concealing, that being when it 
shows itself also conceals, indicates another way of constituting mapping. 
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Instead of guarding against the lie, in mapping revealing the truth can be 
seen as necessarily including concealment. Thus when Monmonier says 
that it is of the essence of mapping to require the lie, it is inconsistent to 
reject maps on the grounds that they lie (such as the Peters projection). 
Cartography (and Monmonier) comes close to developing this line of 
thought (eg., in generalization) but it has never been fully pursued. Thus 
cartography remains an instrumental technology of revealing because it 
wants revealing–unconcealment without concealment.
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